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Date: 2002-12-03

NL: Die Hintertuer der Hintertuer

Dieses Häppchen muss man sich auf der Zungenspitze zergehen lassen - die Hintermänner beschweren sich, dass die Hintertür noch eine Hintertüre hat. Dass diese zum Mossad führen könnte, wie hätte das der holländische Geheimdienst wissen können, bloß weil man Equipment von einem isaelischen Geheimdienstlieferanten bezieht?
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Einige Produktbeschreibungen der genannten Firma sind auf der quintessenziellen surveillance infobase eingelangt.
http://www.quintessenz.org/cgi-bin/index?funktion=view&id=000100002344

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Paul Wouters, Patrick Smits

According to anonymous sources within the Dutch intelligence community, all tapping equipment of the Dutch intelligence services and half the tapping equipment of the national police force, is insecure and is leaking information to Israel. How difficult is it to make a back-door in the Dutch Transport of Intercepted IP Traffic[1] system?

The discussion focusses on the tapping installations for telephony and internet delivered to the government in the last few years by the Israeli company Verint[2].






This company was called Comverse-Infosys[3] until half a year ago, but was quickly renamed when the FBI started several investigations against it and arrested some of its employees in the US on suspicion of espionage. (See pulled FoxNews stories, Politech, Cryptome or Google).


People within the Dutch government got worried too. Especially because they had been warned as early as 1998 about the possible back-doors in the tapping equipment. The ex-ministers of interior ("Binnenlandse Zaken"), Peper and de Vries, could not comment. The minister of Justice at the time, Korthals Altes, was asked to report to parliament in december 2001, where he stated that the security measures meet the required level and that an investigation would be started if this, after all, was not the case. No investigation followed.


In april 2002, Kolkert, procecutor in-chief of the Court of Appeals in Den Bosch, demanded clarification in a letter sent to Stein, the state procecutor ("landelijk officier van justitie") and responsible for interception matters. Stein stated that there are no problems.


On august 24 the project leader of the National Interception Organisation ("Landelijk Interceptie Orgaan", LIO) J.Steeg announced that he plans to check the tapping rooms for backdoors. However, when the equipmenent was bought from the Israelis, it was agreed that no one except Comverse personel was authorized to touch the systems, according to the insider of the AIVD (formerly BVD), the Dutch intelligence organisation that spoke to the EO radioprogram De Ochtenden[4]. Source code would never be available to anyone.


Finally, on October 10th, the Council of Chiefs of Police ("raad van hoofdcommisarissen") sent a confidential letter to the vendors of tapping equipment for ISPs and telcos expressing its concern about the situation in the US.


All of this came after questions were raised publicly in the trial against Baybasin, co-founder of the Kurd parliament in excile, about the possible leaks in the Dutch tapping room as well as manipulation of the collected evidence[4b]. Baybasin was recently sentenced to life-long imprisonment for his connections to assasinations, kidnappings and heroine transports. His lawyers called in experts to question them about the possibility that Israel had laid hands on information tapped by the Dutch. The lawyers claim that Israeli then forwarded the information to the Turkish secret service[5]. Baybasin recently told the media about the Turkish government's involvement with crime syndicates.

c't magazine warned about the blackbox problem in its June 2001 issue[6]. Opentap[7] gave similar warnings on the hacker conference HAL2001[8] in august of 2001 and at the Chaos Computer Club (CCC)[9] in december 2001 with a presentation on lawful interception in the Netherlands[10].

Viel mehr davon
http://www.fnl.nl/ct-nl/archief2003/ct2003-01-02/aftappen.htm


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edited by Harkank
published on: 2002-12-03
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